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Abstract. In a series of recent papers John Martin Fischer argues that the so-
called Molinist solution to the problem of reconciling divine omniscience with 
human freedom does not offer such a  solution at all. Instead, he maintains, 
Molina simply presupposes theological compatibilism. However, Fischer 
construes the problem in terms of sempiternalist omniscience, whereas classical 
Molinism adopts atemporalism. I  argue that, moreover, an atemporalist 
reformulation of Fischer’s argument designed to show that Molinism is not even 
consistent is unsuccessful as well, since it employs a  transfer principle about 
causal inaccessibility that Molina rightfully rejects.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a series of recent papers John Martin Fischer argues that the so-called 
Molinist solution to the problem of reconciling divine omniscience with 
human freedom does not even attempt to offer a response to this problem 
(Fischer 2008, 2009, 2011). ‘I intend to show’, he writes, ‘that [the kernel 
set of ideas in Molina’s theory of God’s omniscience]  ... (contrary to 
what many philosophers apparently think) cannot be invoked to provide 
a  solution to the problem posed by the relationship between God’s 
omniscience and human freedom’ (2011: 208). Instead of presenting such 
a solution, Fischer maintains, Molinism simply presupposes theological 
compatibilism since it assumes ‘from the outset  ... that there exists 
a possible world in which God knows in advance that some agent does 
X and is nevertheless free to do otherwise’ (2009: 138-39). Molinism, he 
argues, is thus ‘question-begging (or at least not dialectically helpful at 
all)’ for the dispute over theological compatibilism (2011: 213; 2008: 28).
Fischer raises an important question here, and his reflections are (as 
so often) helpful and stimulating. Indeed, at first blush it might appear 
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not only that his argument is on target, but that he is obviously right. After 
all, is it not a consequence of ‘middle knowledge’ (scientia media), the 
key concept of Molinism, that if God holds such knowledge He thereby 
knows what some possible creature would freely do in some possible 
situation? Middle knowledge, Molina says in an oft-quoted passage, is 
a kind of divine knowledge
by which, in virtue of the most profound and inscrutable comprehension 
of each faculty of free choice, He [God] saw in His own essence what 
each such faculty would do with its innate freedom were it to be placed in 
this or in that or, indeed, in infinitely many orders of things ...1
As Molina defines it, middle knowledge constitutes divine knowledge 
of free human actions, and hence it may indeed look as if Molina, in 
assuming that the notion of middle knowledge is coherent at all, just 
posits the truth of theological compatibilism.
However, on closer inspection the picture turns out to be somewhat 
different. First, Fischer discusses and criticizes what we may call 
sempiternalist Molinism – the view that an everlasting God has both 
middle knowledge and genuine foreknowledge, the latter concerning 
events which also from God’s point of view are still coming to be. There 
may be such forms of Molinism, yet they differ from paradigmatic or 
classical versions of Molinism. Arguably, the most classical version of 
Molinism is the account put forth by Molina himself. To be sure, Molina 
often uses temporal lingo when presenting his theory. But his official 
position – like that of most late medieval Aristotelians heavily influenced 
by Aquinas – is theological atemporalism. Accordingly, what Molina 
argues for is what I shall call atemporalist Molinism. Fischer argues that 
Molinism does not offer a response to what he calls ‘the Basic Argument’ 
for the incompatibility of God’s (sempiternal) omniscience with human 
freedom (2011: 212). However, classical Molinism has a straightforward 
response to this argument as laid out by Fischer: divine knowledge does 
not occur at times at all; from an atemporalist viewpoint Fischer’s Basic 
Argument is ill-phrased.
1 ‘... mediam scientiam qua ex altissima et inscrutabili comprehensione cuiusque 
liberi arbitrii in sua essentia intuitus est, quid pro sua innata libertate, si in hoc vel illo 
vel etiam infinitis rerum ordinibus collocaretur, acturum esset ...’ (Concordia, disp. 52, 9; 
p.  340/p. 168, emphasis in the English translation C.J.) Here and in what follows the 
English translations follow Freddoso’s, with page references, in this order, to Rabeneck’s 
latin edition of the Concordia and Freddoso’s translation.
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Of course, whether this response succeeds depends, among other 
things, on whether atemporalism is true (or at least rationally acceptable). 
This question is controversial. This paper does not aim to enter into this 
general controversy between temporalists and atemporalists. Instead 
I  shall reconstruct Fischer’s Basic Argument, clarify Molina’s position, 
and then show in some detail why the Basic Argument for theological 
incompatibilism does not apply to Molina’s atemporalist conception of 
divine middle knowledge. A  natural question at this point is whether 
Fischer’s charge can be restated in atemporalist terms. In a second step 
I argue that what most threatens Molina’s atemporalist Molinism in this 
context is an argument to the effect that his position is not even consistent. 
As it turns out, however, Molina has a response to this charge as well.
II. FISCHER’S BASIC ARGUMENT FOR THEOLOGICAL 
INCOMPATIBILISM, AND ATEMPORALIST MOLINISM
What exactly is the ‘Basic Argument’ for theological incompatibilism 
which, according to Fischer, Molina does ‘not even attempt’ to respond to? 
(2008: 25) Fischer notes, first, that ‘whatever else omniscience involves, 
it entails that an omniscient agent believes P just in case P is true’ (2011: 
211). Since Fischer’s argument will adopt theological sempiternalism 
and make the (standard) assumption that God is essentially omniscient, 
we may capture the relevant principle by saying that:
(Omniscience) If A  is essentially sempiternally omniscient, then, 
 necessarily, for any given time T and proposition P, 
 A believes at T that P if and only if P.
Next, Fischer introduces a principle designed to capture the fixity of the 
past, or the view that what one is able, or has in one’s power, to do must 
be an extension of the actual past. Hence:
(FP**) ‘An agent A has it in his power (in the sense relevant to moral 
 responsibility) at (or just prior to) T in possible world W to do 
 F at T only if there is a possible world W* with the same past 
 as that of W up to T in which A does F at T.’ (2011: 211; 2009: 
 129, footnote 8)2
Inspired by Nelson Pike’s classic argument for theological incom-
patibilism (cf. Pike 1965), Fischer then formulates his argument as follows:
2 Fischer uses S, X, and t where I use A, F, and T, respectively.
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‘Suppose that God  ... exists, and that S does X at t2, where X is some 
ordinary act such as raising one’s hand. It follows that God believed at t1 
that S would do X at t2. Given God’s essential omniscience, God’s belief 
at t1 entails that S does X at t2. Thus, in all possible worlds in which God 
believes at t1 that S will do X at t2, S will do X at t2; so in any world in 
which S does not do X at t2, God doesn’t believe at t1 that S does X at t2. It 
seems to follow from (FP**) that S does not have it in his power at or just 
prior to t2 to refrain from X-ing at t2.’ (2011: 211f.; 2009: 129)
It may be helpful to examine a somewhat more schematic presentation 
of this ‘Basic Argument’ for theological incompatibilism. Suppose that 
S does X at t2 and that God exists and is essentially and sempiternally 
omniscient (assumption). It follows, first, that:
(Argument I)
(1) God believes at t1 that S will do X at t2.
Moreover, by (Omniscience) we get:
(2) Necessarily, if God believes at t1 that S will do X at t2, then S does 
X at t2.
If (1) is true, and we count refraining from doing X as doing something 
(which I do not wish to dispute), we can deduce with (FP**) that:
(3) S has it in his power (or is in this sense free) at or just prior to t2 to 
refrain from doing X at t2, only if it is possible that: God believes 
at t1 that S will do X at t2, but S refrains from doing X at t2.
However, (2) is of course just another way of saying that:
(4) It is not possible that: God believes at t1 that S will do X at t2, but S 
refrains from doing X at t2.
From (3) and (4) it follows (by contraposition and modus ponens) that:
(5) S does not have it in his power at or just prior to t2 to refrain from 
doing X at t2.
However, Molina holds a robust libertarian theory of free will and moral 
responsibility which endorses the principle of alternate possibilities, 
according to which an action is free (‘in the sense relevant to moral 
responsibility’) only if the agent could have done otherwise. On this view, 
therefore (5) also tells us that S is not free in doing what he does at t2.
What are we to say of this argument and its significance for classical 
Molinism? First, Molina would dismiss this argument straightforwardly 
because he adopts atemporalism. Second, one may question the relevance 
of the above argument for what Fischer – rightly, I believe – identifies 
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as the key question in this context. This question is whether we enjoy 
power to do otherwise in the sense relevant to moral responsibility (see 
FP** above). But whatever the above argument (1)-(5) achieves, I do not 
think that in its present form it shows that foreknowledge is incompatible 
with the power to do otherwise in this sense. In order to achieve that 
conclusion, it would have to show, first, that S does not have it in his 
power at or just prior to t2 to refrain from doing X at t2 and, second, that 
S does not have a choice (at or just prior to t2), nor ever had a choice, about 
lacking that power at or just prior to t2. In order for this condition to be 
fulfilled, however, the argument would have to maintain that S does not 
have, nor ever had, a choice about God’s believing at t1 that S would do X 
at t2. I begin with the first point, which concerns Molina’s atemporalism.
(i) Molina makes it very clear in the Concordia that, concerning the 
concept of eternity, he wishes to follow Aquinas, Augustine, Boethius, 
Anselm, and others in construing the notion in an atemporalist sense. In 
disp. 48, for example, he discusses ‘whether all the things that exist, have 
existed, and will exist in time are present to God from eternity’ (which is 
part of the title of disp. 48). His answer is affirmative, and he explains that:
eternity is in itself a certain indivisible duration, a simultaneous whole 
having as a  unit an infinite durational latitude by virtue of which 
it coexists and corresponds as a  whole with the whole of time and as 
a  whole with each interval and point of time.  ... [T]he whole of time 
and whatever exists or successively comes to exist in it coexists with and 
exists in the indivisible now of eternity, before which there is nothing 
and after which there is nothing, and in which there is found no before 
or after and no past or future, but only an indivisible, simultaneously 
whole duration.3
Molina proceeds by quoting ‘the holy Fathers’ who, he explains, 
‘sometimes deny that in God there is foreknowledge, properly speaking’.
For in the indivisible now of eternity, which is the duration proper to the 
divine knowledge, all things are present and coexist; and in this eternal 
now there is no before or after  ... So it follows that in God there is no 
foreknowledge with regard to the existence of things in eternity.4
3 ‘Aeternitas ... sit secundum se duratio quaedam indivisibilis tota simul unite habens 
latitudinem durativam infinitam qua coexistit et correspondet tota toti tempori et 
tota singulis partibus ac punctis illius  ... [T]otum tempus et quicquid in eo est aut fit 
successive coexistat et sit in indivisibili nunc aeternitatis, ante quod nihil est et post quod 
nihil aliquid non est, in quo neque cernitur prius aut posterius neque praeteritum aut 
futurum, sed duratio indivisibilis tota simul.’ (Concordia, disp. 48, 2, p. 300/p. 99)
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And Molina goes on approvingly to quote Augustine, Anselm, and 
Boethius on this view.4
The idea that things with temporal existence may be said in 
some sense also to exist in timeless eternity may raise an eyebrow. 
Here I  shall not comment further on this issue, but simply note that 
Molina’s official position is atemporalism, and that he agrees with the 
Augustine-Boethius-Aquinas tradition that ‘properly speaking’ there is 
no foreknowledge in God. So at least Molina’s Molinism has a response 
to the Basic Argument, namely that it (mis)construes divine knowledge 
of human action as a kind of knowledge that occurs in time.
To be sure, when he talks about divine knowledge Molina frequently 
slips into temporal lingo. For example, in the passage just quoted, where 
he denies that there is foreknowledge in God regarding ‘the existence of 
things in eternity’, he goes on to say: ‘... though in relation to time there 
is, altogether properly speaking, foreknowledge in God, since He knows 
things an infinitely long time before they exist.’5 What Molina means, 
however, is that such temporal qualifications of divine actions and 
cognitive states are to be taken nostro intelligendi modo, i.e., in our way 
of understanding (and speaking). Only from the perspective of temporal 
beings may one say that there were times when God knew – knew in 
eternity – what people were going to do. Only in this sense were there 
times, for those temporal beings, when God in His atemporal eternity 
held true beliefs about what would happen.
4 ‘[I]n indivisibili nunc aeternitatis quod est propria duratio scientiae divinae omnia 
sint praesentia et coexistant neque in eo sit prius et posterius ... [F]it ut comparatione 
existentiae rerum in aeternitate non sit praescientia in Deo.’ (Concordia, disp 48, 11, 
pp. 302-303/p. 103; emphasis in the English translation added.) The Concordia contains 
so many passages in which Molina argues along such lines that it is impossible to quote 
them all here. When Molina speaks of ‘eternity’, he almost always refers to timeless 
eternity. To mention just one other representative passage, in disp. 51, 17, Molina says 
that ‘in eternity, insofar as it corresponds to this present time or any past moment of time, 
either God sees with certainty, because of the depth and perfection of His knowledge, 
which part Peter’s free choice is going to turn itself toward tomorrow, or He does not 
see this with certainty. The second answer cannot be given ....’ (‘Deus in aeternitate, ut 
respondet huic praesenti aut cuicumque praeterito temporis momento, ex altitudine 
et perfectione suae scientiae penetrat certo, in quam partem liebrum arbitium Petri se 
inflectet castina die vel non. Non est dandum hoc secundum.’ (p. 333/ p. 156; emphasis 
in the English translation added C.J.)
5 ‘... tametsi collatione facta ad tempus sit in Deo propriissime praescientia qui res scit 
tempore infinito, anteaquam sint.’ (Molina, Concordia, disp. 48, 11, pp. 302-303/p. 103)
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Note that both contemporary friends and foes of Molinism usually 
emphasize that according to Molina middle knowledge occurs 
‘prevolitionally’ in God and thus enjoys some kind of priority over the 
knowledge which God has once He engages in His creative voluntary 
act of actualizing the actual world. Yet what virtually all commentators 
(rightly) emphasize as well is that this priority ought not be (mis-)
construed in a  temporal sense, but is to be conceived as a  ‘logical’ or 
‘explanatory’ kind of priority. According to Molina, ‘before’ creation God 
has (a) ‘natural knowledge’ (scientia naturalis), i.e., knowledge of every 
necessary state of affairs, and (b) ‘middle knowledge’ (scientia media), by 
which He knows what every possible free creature would freely do when 
placed in certain circumstances. When He actualizes the actual world 
God also has, according to Molina, (c) ‘free knowledge’ (scientia libera), 
i.e., postvolitional knowledge of all the actual contingent states of affairs 
which from then on obtain in the actual world.6 However, commentators 
typically stress, and with good reason, that the corresponding stages of 
creation which Molinists distinguish should not be construed as referring 
to some temporal order, but as referring to a conceptual or explanatory 
kind of priority. We would not need this caveat if according to Molinism 
God’s knowledge occurred at certain points in time.7 I conclude that, if 
this is how Molina sees the matter, he could, and should, immediately 
reject the basic assumption of the Fischer-Pike argument according to 
which there is sempiternal divine knowledge. Accordingly, he could 
immediately dismiss its central premise (1). God doesn’t know anything 
at any time, but this is not because He is not omniscient. It is because He 
doesn’t have knowledge at times.
In fact Fischer explicitly considers atemporalism as one of ‘various 
ways to respond to the Basic Argument’ (2011: 212). However, he 
apparently does not regard it as a route Molina could take: ‘The kernel 
set of ideas in Molina’s theory of God’s omniscience ... cannot be invoked 
6 Cf. Molina, Concordia, disp. 52, 9, pp. 339-40/p. 168.
7 Freddoso, for example, emphasizes more than one time that the characterization 
of the three kinds of divine knowledge as prevolitional and postvolitional ought not to 
be misconstrued in a  temporal sense. (See for example Freddoso 1988: 3, footnote 3: 
‘By dubbing such knowledge prevolitional I mean to point to a conceptual or logical, 
rather than temporal, ordering within the divine knowledge. Here I follow Molina.’) He 
also emphasizes Molina’s ‘strong adherence to the doctrine that God is eternal [in an 
atemporalist sense]’, and notes that, unfortunately, this ‘does not deter him [Molina] 
from using tensed language when speaking of God’s knowledge of and causal influence 
on temporal creatures.’ (Freddoso 1988: 33-34)
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to provide a solution to the problem posed by the relationship between 
God’s omniscience and human freedom’ (2011: 208). However, if Fischer’s 
first claim (about atemporalism as a possible response) is true then this 
latter claim is false, given that atemporalism is among the central tenets 
of Molina’s account, and that it is consistent with it.
It often seems as if Fischer identifies Molinism with Molina’s claim 
that there is divine middle knowledge. This identification is inaccurate, 
it may be argued, since it does not pay much tribute to the richness 
and complexity of Molina’s views. However, Fischer explicitly concedes 
this and says that his aim is ‘not to do history of philosophy or textual 
exegesis, but, rather, to lay out and philosophically evaluate a  certain 
set of views’ (2011: 209). Moreover, whatever we may say about various 
other aspects of Molina’s overall philosophy of providence and freedom, 
why should we not sever his theological atemporalism from his theory 
of middle knowledge? Wouldn’t this move allow Fischer to maintain that 
Molinism, reduced to the theory of middle knowledge, indeed fails to 
provide a response to the Basic Argument?
The problem with this reply is that Molina does seem to regard his 
notion of middle knowledge as being essentially embedded in his overall 
atemporalist theology. By middle knowledge, he says, God knows in 
His own essence what each free creature would freely do in any given 
circumstance (cf. our first quote from Molina above in section 1). But 
if God exists in timeless eternity, this is part of His essence. Whatever 
His mode of existence, it does not pertain to Him contingently. Hence 
Molina’s atemporalism is not just a  ramus amputandus of his theory 
of middle knowledge. As the account has it, God knows essentially in 
timeless eternity what every possible free creature would freely do in any 
possible circumstance. So, the dispute is not just about the label ‘Molinism’. 
Even if we identify classical ‘Molinism’ with Molina’s theory of middle 
knowledge, since this theory concerns atemporalist divine knowledge, it 
does contain a response to Fischer’s sempiternalist Basic Argument.
(ii) I turn now to the second problem with the Fischer-Pike argument 
for theological incompatibilism. Fischer claims that the Basic Argument 
pertains to the power to do otherwise ‘in the sense relevant to moral 
responsibility’ (see FP**). Hence the desired conclusion of the Basic 
Argument is that S does not have the power to refrain from doing 
X at t2 and is thus not morally responsible for doing X at t2. Fischer is 
certainly right on this point. What worries philosophical theologians 
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since St.  Paul8 is whether, and on what grounds, humans may be held 
accountable for their deeds, and how they can be said to sin, if all of 
their actions are foreseen by God. Unfortunately, however, Fischer’s 
Basic Argument, as it stands, does not yield the conclusion that S is not 
morally responsible for doing X at t2. Given Molina’s libertarianism and 
his acceptance of the principle of alternate possibilities, in order to allow 
that conclusion, the argument would have to show in addition that S has 
no choice about whether God knows at t1 that S is going to do X at t2. 
Consider the following example from van Inwagen:
Suppose that when I  am drunk it is not within my power to refrain 
from violently assaulting those who disagree with me about politics. 
I get drunk and overhear a remark about Cuban troops in Angola and, 
soon, therefore, Fred’s nose is broken. I was, under the circumstances, 
unable to refrain from breaking Fred’s nose. And yet no one doubts that 
I am to blame for his broken nose. How can that be? Simple: Although 
I was unable to avoid breaking his nose, that inability is one I could have 
avoided having (van Inwagen 1989: 236).
In these circumstances, van Inwagen would be to blame for breaking 
Fred’s nose because he would be morally responsible for it (and because, 
let us assume, his action is morally reprehensible). The latter holds 
because, even though given the antecedent conditions of his action he 
does not have the power to refrain from acting as he does at the time 
in question, nothing rules out that he had a choice about whether these 
antecedent conditions obtained. A  similar point applies to Fischer’s 
Basic Argument. If it wants to establish that S, due to lacking the power 
to do otherwise at t2, is not morally responsible for doing X at t2, the 
conclusion would have to be that S does not have it in his power at or 
just prior to t2 to refrain from doing X at t2 and does not have, nor ever 
had, a choice about this lack of power because S does not have, nor ever 
had, a choice about the (sufficient) antecedent conditions of his action. 
The Basic Argument would therefore have to reason from the premise 
that S does not have, nor ever had, a choice about God’s believing at t1 
that S will do X at t2. Molina, however, rejects such claims. ‘It is not’, he 
writes, ‘because God foresees these things as future that they are going 
to be; rather, it is because they are going to be, by virtue of created free 
choice, that they are foreseen as future by God’ (Concordia, disp. 51, 4; p. 
328/p. 149). According to this view, therefore, there was a time, after all, 
8 See for example his discussion of the fate of Jacob and Esau in Romans 9:11-13.
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when S had a choice about God’s foreknowing that S would do X at t2. 
It was the time when S decided to do X at t2, for, had S decided at that 
time to refrain from doing X at t2, God would have believed that S would 
refrain from doing X at t2.
Molina, I argued, endorses atemporalism. Hence we may read him 
here as claiming that, even if a sempiternalist argument for theological 
incompatibilism along the lines of Fischer’s Basic Argument were 
acceptable and not to be dismissed from the outset, such an argument 
should be rejected because it gets the order of explanation wrong. Given 
Molina’s atemporalism, however, I  shall not pursue this sempiternalist 
response with respect to Fischer’s original argument. Instead, I shall now 
turn to atemporalist Molinism and ask whether an argument in Fischer’s 
spirit might be reformulated on such classical Molinist grounds.
III. IS ATEMPORALIST MOLINISM COHERENT?
A natural view is that an action is performed freely – in the sense relevant 
to moral responsibility – only if the agent is, at least in part, causally 
responsible for it or, as I  shall say, has a  causal impact on it. We may 
capture this in the following principle:
(CI) A human agent A performs an action freely only if A contributes 
 causally to it.
(CI), I contend, states a moderate and highly plausible necessary condi-
tion for an action to be free. It is hard to see how an action whose agent 
has no causal influence whatever upon it should qualify as having been 
performed freely. Indeed, many authors would say that in such a case it 
doesn’t even qualify as an action at all.
Not only is (CI) systematically very plausible, it also is a  tenet of 
classical Molinism. Along with Aquinas and many other late medieval 
authors Molina holds that, while God is the primary (or remote) 
cause of every contingent state of affairs, free human actions are such 
that their agents serve as secondary (or proximate) causes of them. 
Any free creaturely action, on this view, is such that its agent causally 
contributes to performing it (as a  secondary cause), thereby giving 
God’s ‘general concurrence’ which makes that action possible at all 
a particular direction. While human agents do not, and cannot, see to it 
that all necessary conditions for their free actions are fulfilled, freedom 
nevertheless requires agents to be causally involved in those actions. 
Regarding Molina’s way of phrasing the problem, it will be helpful to 
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formulate the following corollary of (CI). (CI) entails that, if an agent 
does not contribute causally to something he does, then what he does 
is not done freely. It follows that, if for metaphysical reasons an agent 
cannot contribute causally to some event, then even less does this event 
qualify as a free action of his. Now, let us say that, if an agent A cannot 
contribute causally to some event or state of affairs at a given time t, that 
event or state of affairs is ‘causal-impact necessary’ (CI-necessary) for 
A at t. So we have:
(CI-Nec) An agent A  performs an action freely at t only if that 
  action is not CI-necessary for A at t.
A critic may argue that this principle can be deployed to show not only 
that (atemporalist) Molinism fails to respond to the charge of theological 
incompatibilism, but that the Molinist position is not even consistent. The 
argument can be presented as a reductio.9 Let S once more denote a given 
human agent, and suppose that S, being in circumstances C at t, does X 
at t. Suppose that God exists and is essentially atemporally omniscient 
(assumption), i.e., suppose that necessarily, if God eternally believes that p 
then p, and vice versa. (From now on I use ‘eternal’, ‘eternity’, and so forth, 
exclusively in an atemporal sense.) The anti-Molinist’s reasoning might 
then go as follows. According to Molina, he may argue, it holds that:
(Argument II)
(1) It is CI-necessary for S (at any time in S’s life) that God eternally 
believe via middle knowledge that S, when placed in circumstance 
C at t, would freely do X at t.
(2) Necessarily, if God eternally believes via middle knowledge that S, 
when placed in circumstance C at t, would freely do X at t, then S, 
when placed in C at t, freely does X at t.
(3) Hence, it is CI-necessary for S (at any time in S’s life) that, when 
placed in C at t, he freely does X at t.
However, (CI-Nec) tells us that an action is performed freely at t only if 
it is not CI-necessary for its agent at t. Hence, with this principle we can 
derive from (3) the self-contradictory statement that:
(4) S is not free in doing X freely when placed in C at t.
Since (4) is contradictory, the above argument – if it goes through – is 
a reductio of Molina’s atemporalist Molinism.
9 For related versions see Jäger (2011a) and (2011b).
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Molinists have at least two responses to this argument. The first 
concerns premise (1). How might Molina’s opponent back up this 
premise? Theological considerations aside, a natural line of reasoning is 
that, just as we cannot control the past, nor can we influence the realm 
of the timeless. But why do we lack control over the past? Because, the 
reasoning may go, we cannot causally influence it. And the reason usually 
presented for this is that backward causation is impossible.10 Backward 
causation is a process type in which a cause occurs later in time than its 
effect, and we tend to be sceptical about backward causation because 
we assume that precisely this must not be allowed. Note however that 
this argument does not rule out that temporal beings can have a causal 
impact on something in the realm of the timeless. For temporal beings 
and their actions and decisions certainly do not occur later in time than 
timeless states of affairs. In short, our denial of causal access to the past 
seems to be grounded in a no-later-in-time requirement for causes; yet 
a parallel argument does not work for denying that it is possible to have 
a causal impact on what God eternally believes about human actions.
There are other reasons for claiming that we cannot have a  causal 
impact on what occurs outside time. A  standard argument is that in 
a cause-effect relation both relata must be temporal entities. The problem 
with this argument, however, is that it would also preclude a timeless God 
from causally affecting the temporal world. To be sure, this is one of the 
main philosophical reasons anti-eternalists have traditionally put forth 
in favour of sempiternalism.11 Yet the issue is highly controversial, and 
Molina is an atemporalist. So if we assume, with classical Molinism and 
many other authors in the Augustine-Boethius-Aquinas tradition, that 
God is timeless yet can still causally interact with His creation as it unfolds 
in time, there is no reason, at least no obvious philosophical one, to object 
to the idea that causation may also proceed from inside to outside of time. 
I conclude that, from the point of view of classical atemporalist Molinism, 
good reasons for premise (1) in Argument II are thin on the ground.
10 The following argument draws on Zagzebski (2011: 73).
11 Cf. for example Swinburne (1993a), chapter 12; and (1993b). In this latter work 
Swinburne argues that ‘if God causes the beginning or continuing existence of the world, 
and perhaps interferes in its operation from time to time, his acting must be prior to the 
effects that his action causes’ (p. 216). Concerning Stump and Kretzmann’s atemporalism 
and their notion of ‘ET-simultaneity’ (Stump and Kretzmann 1993), Swinburne argues 
that ‘no reason has been given for supposing that if God has an existence outside (our) 
time, he can have any relation to the events of time which would be in any way analogous 
to “causing” or “observing” them’ (p. 218).
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Molina’s second response to Argument II could be that, whatever we 
may say about premise (1), the inference from (1) and (2) to (3) is dubious 
as well. This inference relies on a  closure or transfer principle that is 
structurally analogous to the necessity version of van Inwagen’s famous 
principle Beta.12 The inference from (1) and (2) to (3) in Argument II 
relies on the rule that:
(Transfer) If an agent A  cannot have, and could never have had, 
 a causal impact on p (or on an event that grounds the 
 truth of p), and necessarily, if p then q, then A cannot 
 have, nor could ever have had, a causal impact on q (or 
 on an event that grounds the truth of q).
The qualification ‘or an event that grounds  ...’ is meant to preserve 
neutrality towards particular theories of causation. Some will say that, 
since propositions are abstract objects and thus do not exist in time, one 
cannot have a causal impact on them. However, even if one accepts an 
inside-time requirement for the relata of causation, we could still say that 
agents can have a causal impact on events which are such that, if they 
occur, certain corresponding propositions are true.
Does Molina accept (Transfer), and is this principle true? I think that 
both questions are to be answered in the negative. The interpretative 
question is somewhat complex, and here I  shall only give its bare 
outlines.13 In disp. 52 of the Concordia Molina explicitly discusses and 
rejects seven arguments in favour of theological incompatibilism. (This 
is one more reason why one might hesitate to accuse Molina of not even 
attempting to explain how divine omniscience might be compatible with 
human freedom.) Some of these arguments bear close similarities to 
Fischer’s Basic Argument. For example, Molina asks us to consider a line 
of anti-compatibilist reasoning he reconstructs as follows:
If a conditional is true and its antecedent is absolutely necessary, then 
its consequent is likewise absolutely necessary; otherwise, in a  valid 
consequence, the antecedent could be true and the consequent false, 
which is in no way to be admitted. But the conditional ‘If God knew that 
this was going to be, then it will so happen’ is true, or else God’s knowledge 
would be false; and the antecedent is absolutely necessary, both because 
12 See van Inwagen (1983: 94). The original principle has the form: Np, N(p ⊃ q) 
|– Nq, where ‘Np’ is, in one application, to be read as saying that p, and no one has (or 
ever had) a choice about whether p.
13 For a more extensive treatment, however, see Jäger (2011a).
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it is eternal and because it is past-tense and there is no power over the 
past. Therefore, the consequent will be absolutely necessary as well, and 
hence no future thing foreknown by God will be contingent.14
Some comments are in order. First, as Molina makes clear in his reply to 
this argument (to be quoted soon), what is really at issue here is not just 
a ‘true’ conditional but one that is necessary. For clearly, it is not only true 
but necessarily true – true for conceptual reasons – that, if God knew that 
X was going to happen, X would happen. The conditional in question, the 
‘valid consequence’, as Molina says, thus has the form ❏(p ⊃ q). Second, 
whereas the kind of necessity pertaining to the conditional as a whole 
is metaphysical or ‘broadly logical necessity’, the ‘absolute’, that is, non-
conditional necessity of the antecedent (i.e., of ‘God knew that this was 
going to happen’) is of a different kind. After all, the antecedent is said 
to be necessary ‘both because it is eternal and past’. This would not be 
a good reason to count this proposition as (broadly) logically necessary. 
The question is exactly which kind of non-logical necessity and which 
kind of transfer principle concerning mixed modalities is at issue. Let 
‘N’ stand for the kind of non-logical necessity in question. The text of 
the above quotation is indifferent as to whether the transfer principle 
in question is of the form: Np, ❏(p ⊃ q) |– ❏q, or of the form: Np, 
❏(p ⊃ q) |– Nq. Given that ‘N’ will in any case be an operator denoting 
some weaker kind of necessity than logical necessity, the former principle 
is quite obviously false. Hence what is under consideration, it seems, is 
the truth of a principle of the form Np, ❏(p ⊃ q) |– Nq.
Molina responds to the argument by rejecting its inference as invalid, 
thereby rejecting the modal transfer principle it employs. His response 
is that:
In such a case, even if (i) the conditional is necessary (because in the 
composed sense these two things cannot both obtain, namely, that God 
foreknows something to be future and that the thing does not turn out 
that way), and even if (ii) the antecedent is necessary in the sense in 
14 ‘Si conditionalis aliqua est vera et eius antecedens est absolute necessarium, 
consequens est etiam absolute necessarium; alioquin in bona consequentia esse posst 
antecedens verum et consequens falsum, quod nulla ratione est admittendum. Sed haec 
condicionalis est vera: si Deus scivit hoc esse futurum, id ita eveniet, alioquin scientia 
Deo esset falsa; et antecedens est absolute necessarium, tum quia aeternum, tum etiam 
quia praeteritum et ad praeteritum non est potentia. Ergo consequens erit etiam absolute 
necessarium ac proinde nullum futurum praescitum a Deo erit contingens.’ (Concordia, 
disp. 52, 3, pp. 337-8/pp. 167-8)
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question (because it is past-tense and because no shadow of alteration 
can befall God), nonetheless the consequent can be purely contingent.15
So he agrees with his opponent that the conditional is necessary – 
necessary in the (broadly) logical sense, we may interpret him – and that 
the antecedent is necessary in some other sense. Yet he disagrees that 
from this we can deduce that the consequent is necessary – necessary 
in that other sense – as well. Molina, in other words, denies that the 
rule Np, ❏(p ⊃ q) |– Nq is valid for the kind of necessity for which 
‘N’ stands. It remains to be answered what kind of necessity applies in 
the argument’s antecedent, the claim that God ‘foreknows’ that a certain 
event, for example some human action, is going to happen.
Various interpreters, including Freddoso, argue that what Molina 
denies here is that so-called ‘accidental necessity’ is closed under 
entailment, and that Molina therefore thinks that incompatibilist 
arguments which rely on the idea that accidental necessity is so closed 
are invalid.16 As introduced by William of Sherwood, accidental 
necessity is a time-relative kind of necessity pertaining to propositions 
or states of affairs that are past and thus ‘over and done with’.17 If a state 
of affairs is accidentally necessary, no one can affect it anymore. If this 
interpretation were correct, we might have the potential for a reply to 
Fischer’s sempiternalist version of the Basic Argument. However, given 
Molina’s atemporalism and his characterization of the antecedent of 
the argument in question as ‘eternal’, I  think that this interpretation is 
doubtful. Instead, I  think that Molina may plausibly be interpreted as 
denying that causal-impact necessity is closed under entailment. Molina, 
it seems, denies (Transfer). After all, why might one think that the 
antecedent of the argument in question (that God knew that this was 
going to be) is in some sense necessary on account of its both being (i) 
‘eternal’ and – nostro intelligendi modo – (ii) ‘past-tense’? A natural reason 
15 ‘Tunc enim, esto conditionalis sit necessaria, quia in sensu composito cohaerere non 
possunt ista duo, quod Deus aliquid praesciat futurum et illud non eo modo eveniat, et 
esto antecedens illo modo sit necessarium, quia praeteritum et quia in Deum nulla possit 
cadere vicissitudinis obumbratio, nihilominus consequens potest esse mere contingens.’ 
(Concordia, disp. 52, 34, p. 353/p. 189)
16 Freddoso (1988: 55); see also Zagzebski (1991: 131-32), and Zagzebski (2002).
17 According to William of Sherwood ‘that is accidentally necessary which neither 
now nor in the future can be false, but once might have been false’. (‘Necessarium autem 
per accidens est, quod non potest nec poterit esse falsum, potuit tamen’; Introductiones 
Logicam, 11, p. 34.)
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is that both what is past and what is atemporally eternal are causally 
inaccessible. To summarize: There is a highly plausible reading of Molina 
according to which he denies, in his response to a certain argument for 
theological incompatibilism, that what I called causal-impact necessity 
is closed under entailment. And this, I maintain, also yields a response 
to Argument II above, which in its inference from (1) and (2) to (3) 
employs a principle according to which causal-impact necessity is closed 
under entailment.
There may be some room for interpreting Molina’s writings on the 
issue. However, the crucial systematic question at this point is whether 
(Transfer) really is invalid. And whatever Molina’s views on this question 
may have been, I  think that it should be answered in the positive. 
Somewhat ironically, we may support this verdict by considering a type 
of counterexample that Fischer himself once used to refute the claim 
that a related notion, namely that of moral responsibility, is closed under 
entailment.18 Some 400 years after the second edition of the Concordia 
appeared in print (in 1595), a fellow Jesuit of Molina’s, Mark Ravizza S.J., 
presented counterexamples to the responsibility version of van Inwagen’s 
famous rule Beta which draw on cases of causal overdetermination 
(Ravizza 1994). A  few years later, Stump and Fischer reformulated 
Ravizza-style counterexamples in such a way that they would also fit the 
necessity version of rule Beta, as applied to moral responsibility. A very 
similar kind of counterexample, I  maintain, can also be used to show 
that (Transfer), which concerns, not (lack of) moral responsibility, but 
what I called ‘causal-impact necessity’, is invalid. Here is an example of 
my own, based on Agatha Christie’s story ‘Murder on the Orient Express’.
The ingenious detective Hercule Poirot finds out that Mr. Ratchet has 
been stabbed to death by twelve different conspirators (by Princess Natalia 
Dragomiroff, Hector Willard McQueen, Colonel Arbuthnot, Hildegard 
Schmidt, and others). Each had a motive and stabbed the victim. We can 
easily retell the story in such a way that (i) each stabbing was causally 
sufficient for Ratchet’s death, and that (ii) each stabbing caused his death 
via deterministic causal chains. Moreover, let us stipulate that (iii) none 
of the protagonists could have had any causal influence on any of their 
allies’ lethal actions. In these circumstances, for each conspirator, the 
stabbing performed by any of his or her fellow murderers is CI-necessary. 
18 See for example Stump and Fischer (2000). Such examples are also discussed in 
Fischer and Ravizza (1998).
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Second, by stipulation it holds that, necessarily: If one of the stabbings 
is performed, the victim will die; there is no possible world with the 
same laws of nature in which the victim is stabbed by any one of the 
agents but survives. However, Ratchet’s death is not CI-necessary for 
any of the murderers, since each of them was causally involved in that 
event. Ex hypothesi each individual act of stabbing was causally sufficient 
for the victim’s death. This is a counterexample to (Transfer). We have 
instantiations of the facts that it is CI-necessary for a given agent that  p; 
necessarily, if p then q; yet it is not CI-necessary for that agent that q. 
Given that Fischer endorses structurally similar counterarguments 
to similar transfer principles, I  think that he should also accept this 
counterexample to (Transfer). In any case, this example seems to me 
to succeed against (Transfer), and hence it appears that Argument II 
against atemporalist Molinism, which at first glance seemed a promising 
fallback position for Fischer, should be rejected as well.
IV. MOLINA ON HUMAN CHOICE ABOUT DIVINE BELIEFS
There is yet another string to the anti-Molinist’s bow, one may argue, 
even if we assume atemporalism. For is not the question more generally 
whether human agents have a choice about divine beliefs about human 
actions, and whether these human agents can prevent God from forming 
these beliefs?19 If they cannot, the corresponding human actions would 
appear unavoidable too, and thus the problem would recur. Suppose we 
substitute, in Argument II, ‘S never has a choice about the fact that ...’ for 
‘it is CI-necessary for S ... that ...’. Suppose again that S does X at t. The 
critic may then reason as follows:
(Argument III)
(1) S never (i.e., at no time in S’s life) has a choice about the fact (or 
truth of the proposition) that God eternally believes via middle 
knowledge that S, when placed in circumstance C at t, would 
freely do X at t.
(2) Necessarily, if God eternally believes via middle knowledge that S, 
when placed in circumstance C at t, would freely do X at t, then S, 
when placed in C at t, freely does X at t.
(3) Hence, S never has a  choice about the fact (or truth of the 
proposition) that, when placed in C at t, he freely does X at t.
19 I am indebted to Patrick Todd for this point.
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Following van Inwagen, let us say that, if S has no choice about p, then 
S cannot see to it that not-p, or – if p stands for a proposition – cannot 
render p false. Now, on a libertarian conception of free will which accepts 
the principle of alternate possibilities it holds that:
(Choice) A performs an action freely at t only if there is a time when 
 A has a choice about performing that action at t.
With this principle we can again deduce from (3) the self-contradictory 
statement that:
(4) S is not free in doing X freely in C at t.
This argument shows, Molina’s opponent may maintain, that if we 
construe the atemporalist version of our anti-Molinist argument in terms 
van Inwagen’s good old notion of lack of choice, the reductio goes through.
Argument III, too, employs a modal transfer principle which roughly 
has the form Nsp, ❏(p ⊃ q) |– NSq; only that this time the N-operator, 
supplemented by a subject index and prefixed to p, is to be interpreted in 
terms of there never being a choice for S as to whether p. Whether the no-
choice operator is closed under entailment is not uncontroversial either; 
yet I concede that such a principle is harder to come by than (Transfer).
However, Molina has a response to Argument III as well. As already 
noted in section II, he frequently stresses that it would be a mistake to 
believe that we do what we do because God believes that we do it. Instead, 
he argues, God holds true beliefs about what we do because we (freely) 
do it. For example, consider the following two representative passages:
He [God] knows with certainty, before the determination of His will, 
what such-and-such a  faculty of free choice would do in its freedom 
on the hypothesis and condition that God should create it and situate 
it in this particular order of things – even though it could, if it so willed, 
do the opposite, and even though if it was going to do the opposite, as 
it is able to, then God would have known this in His essence through 
that very same knowledge and comprehension, and not what He in fact 
knows is going to be done by that faculty of free choice.20
In disp. 52 Molina explicitly says that God knows what he knows about 
free creaturely actions because of these actions, and not vice versa:
20 ‘[A]nte illam determinationem voluntatis certo scit, quid tale liberum arbitrium sit 
facturum pro sua libertate ex hypothesi et condicione, quod illud creet et constituat in 
eo ordine rerum, cum tamen possit, si vellit, facere oppositum, et si esset facturum, ut 
potest, Deus illa eadem scientia et comprehensione liberi arbitrii in sua essentia scivisset 
et non id quo re ipsa scit a libero arbitrio esse agendum.’ (Concordia, disp. 50, 15, pp. 324-
25/ pp. 140-41; emphases in the English translation added by Freddoso.)
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For ... the things that issue forth from our choice or depend on it are not 
going to happen because they are foreknown by God as going to happen, 
but, to the contrary, they are foreknown by God as going to happen in 
this or that way because they are so going to happen by virtue of our 
freedom of choice – though if they were going to happen in a contrary 
way, as they are able to, then from eternity they would be foreknown as 
going to happen in that contrary way instead of in the way they are in 
fact foreknown as going to happen.21
Adopting terminology recently suggested by Brüntrup and Schneider 
(2011) in a paper that discusses the present problem, we may say that, 
according to Molina, free creatures enjoy ‘counterfactual power’ over 
what God believes about their free actions. In a sense, we do have the 
power to make a possible world actual in which we do otherwise and in 
which, correspondingly, God holds different beliefs about what we do.
Molina, I  believe, again argues from an atemporalist perspective 
when he says that human actions are ‘from eternity foreknown’ by God. 
Note however that the above passages could be read as containing yet 
another response to Fischer’s sempiternalist Basic Argument. Suppose for 
the sake of argument that we adopt sempiternalist Molinism. Even then 
Molina’s claims would in no way clash with the fixity of the past. Molina 
wholeheartedly endorses that the past cannot be changed: ‘It manifestly 
involves a contradiction’, he writes, ‘for there to be power over the past.’22 
This view is perfectly consistent with there being ‘counterfactual power’ 
over sempiternal divine beliefs. Consider the assumptions of the Basic 
Argument (that S does X at t2 and that God knows this in advance), and 
suppose that S is able to refrain from doing X at t2. What follows is not that, 
were S to refrain from doing X at t2, S would – per impossibile – change 
the actual past, including the fact that God knew at t1 that S would do X at 
t2. What follows is only that, were S to refrain from doing X at t2, the past 
would have been different from the way it actually was, and consequently 
that God would not have believed at t1 that S would do X at t2.
21 ‘Cum enim res quae a nostro arbitrio emanant aut ab eo pendent non ideo sint futurae, 
quia a  Deo praecognoscuntur futurae, sed e contrario ideo a  Deo praecognoscantur 
hoc vel illo modo futurae, quia ita pro libertate arbitrii sint futurae, quod si contrario 
modo, ut possunt, essent futurae, contrario etiam modo et non eo quo reipsa sciuntur 
praecognoscerentur ex aeternitate futurae.’ (Concordia, disp. 52, 29, p. 349/p.184) Similar 
statements are frequent in the Concordia. For another passage see for example disp. 51, 4.
22 ‘Manifeste implicat contradictionem dari ad prateritum potentiam.’ (Concordia, 
disp. 51, 19; p. 334/p. 158)
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In the above passages, Molina once more – and perhaps somewhat 
misleadingly – talks about divine ‘foreknowledge’. Yet he also says that this 
knowledge is knowledge ‘from eternity’, by which he means atemporal 
eternity. So here as well, talk about ‘foreknowledge’ is to be understood 
nostro intelligendi modi. What Molina really argues, I maintain, is that 
human agents enjoy counterfactual power over timeless divine beliefs 
concerning human actions. It is in this sense, he believes, that human 
agents do have a  choice about God’s eternal beliefs and that therefore 
premise (1) of Argument III is false. S has a choice about God’s (truly) 
believing, via middle knowledge, that S would do X at t. For were S to 
act differently, a different counterfactual of freedom would be true, and 
consequently God would (eternally) have a different belief.
I think that this is a promising line of reasoning for Molina. Yet we 
should note the following problem.23 If we concede that human beings 
can have counterfactual power over divine beliefs, it might appear 
natural also to concede that we can have counterfactual power over the 
past or over laws of nature. The question, in other words, is whether the 
above quoted statements commit Molina to the view that, in a universe 
which is governed by deterministic causal arrangements, human actions 
can still count as free since, had the agent acted differently, the past or 
the natural laws would have been different. If so, it is hard to see why 
Molina argues so fiercely for theological compatibilism yet emphatically 
endorses causal, or nomological, incompatibilism. If it suffices for 
a human action to be free (in the sense relevant to moral responsibility) 
that the agent enjoy counterfactual power over the corresponding divine 
beliefs, why should it not also suffice for human freedom with respect to 
deterministic laws and the past that the agent have counterfactual power 
over such conditions?24 If the Molinist would countenance such a power, 
however, he might jeopardize his libertarianism. For in that case an 
action’s being causally determined would not prevent it from qualifying 
as free, or its agent’s being morally responsible for it.
In order to respond to this problem, the Molinist will have to show 
that, on closer inspection, these two kinds of power are in fact relevantly 
different. He must convincingly argue that, while it is sufficient for 
a  human agent to act freely that he enjoys counterfactual power over 
23 Here I am indebted again to Brüntrup and Schneider. For more on this problem 
see their (2011).
24 For a classic argument to the effect that we enjoy such power over the laws of nature 
see Lewis (1986).
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eternal divine beliefs, a  similar power over the past and deterministic 
laws of nature does not suffice to guarantee freedom (in the sense relevant 
to moral responsibility). I  think that such an argument may be found. 
After all, atemporal divine beliefs are ontologically different entities from 
laws of nature and contingent temporal states of affairs. What such an 
argument would look like, however, is a topic for another paper.25
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